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NOTES AND COMMENT
SOME ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONAL INJURY
AND DEATHr ACTIONS.

In the recent case of Kwiatkowski v. Lowry'

an action was

brought by plaintiff as executrix, under the "wrongful death" statute 2
to recover for loss suffered by the next of kin as a result of the death
of her testator, occasioned by an injury received while at work on a
building. Oral and written statements made by the testator, in which
he made no report of the accident, were not admitted in favor of
defendant as admissions against interest. It was held that the
"wrongful death" statute in New York created a new cause of action
in favor of the next of kin, totally disconnected from any right which
the deceased may have had during his lifetime. Consequently, any
statements made by the deceased could not be used against his next
of kin, who, in this action, were not claiming through him. While
there is nothing startling or original in the above proposition of law
inasmuch as it has been so held by our Court of i4ppeals too many
times to admit of any further profitable discussion; 8 yet, in view of
the fact that this marks the first time that a New York court has
considered the problem of admissions in a wrongful death action, and
in further view of the fact that a reading of some of our cases adjudicated under the statute seems to indicate that in certain instances the
rights of the next of kin are dependent upon the primary right of, the
deceased 4 it would be well to consider the particular problem involved
'248 App. Div. 459, 290 N. Y. Supp. 627 (2d Dept. 1936).
1 NEw YoRK DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 130: "A ction by executor or adinin-

istrator for negligence or wrongful act or default causing death of decedent.
The executor or administrator duly appointed in this State, or in any other
state, territory or district of the United States, or in any foreign country, of a
decedent who has left him or her surviving a husband, wife, or next of kin,
may maintain an action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect or
default, by which the decedent's death was caused, against a natural person
who, or a corporation which, would have been liable to an action in favor of
the decedent by reason thereof if death had not ensued. Such an action must
be commenced within two years after the decedent's death * * *."
8 Crapo v. City of Syracuse, 183 N. Y. 395, 76 N. E. 465 (1906) ; McKay
v. Syracuse Rapid Transit Ry. Co., 208 N. Y. 359, 101 N. E. 885 (1913);
Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry. Co., 251 N. Y. 127,
167 N. E. 194 (1929) ; Werra v. Cassedy, 229 App. Div. 590, 243 N. Y. Supp.
545 (2d Dept. 1930).
'For example, where the injured person has recovered a judgment or
given a release, such judgment or release has been held to be a good defense
to an action under § 130. Littlewood v. City of N. Y., 89 N. Y. 24 (1882).
Also where the deceased had failed to prosecute his personal injury action
within the statutory period, the defense of statute of limitations is good as
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and at the same time briefly observe the manner in which the problem
has been dealt with by courts of other jurisdictions. It is elementary
that at common law the maxim "Actio personalis moritur cure persona" applied.5 In 1846 there was enacted in England what is commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act 6 which provided, in effect,
that an action may be maintained whenever death is caused by a
wrongful act, neglect, or default of another, which wrongful act would
have entitled the person injured to maintain an action if death had not
ensued. The action was to be brought in the name of the executor
or administrator of the injured deceased for the benefit of designated
persons, members of deceased's family or next of kin, and the damages
recoverable in such action were the pecuniary damages suffered by
such beneficiaries by reason of the death. Statutes similar to Lord
Campbell's Act have been enacted by many of the states in this
country; so that, today, in most of our jurisdictions, some form of
remedy survives the death of the injured person. In some instances,
the cause of action of the injured party does not abate with his death
but may be continued for the benefit of his estate; 7 in other instances
upon the death of the injured party, his cause of action abates and a
new cause of action arises for the benefit of his next of kin.8 In the
former case, the statutes are not true patterns of Lord Campbell's
Act for whereas the Act was held to create a new cause of action, 9
one which arose only when death resulted from the injuries, and to
permit the recovery of damages, viz., the pecuniary loss sustained by
reason of the death of the injured, these survival statutes are designed
to preserve the action which the deceased himself, had he remained
alive, could have maintained. In such cases it seems likely that any
statements made by the deceased would be admissible against those
bringing the action either as admissions or as declarations against
interest, for the damages would then be the loss which the deceased
himself would have sustained.
against the administrator suing under § 130. Kelliher v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.
Co., 212 N. Y. 207, 105 N. E. 824 (1914) ; see Haas, Adm'x v. N. Y. PostGraduate Medical School and Hospital, 131 Misc. 395, 226 N. Y. Supp. 617
(1928). See note 19 infra for further discussion.
'HARPER.

THaE LAW OF TORTS (1933)

'9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846).

§279.

' Kling v. Torello, 87 Conn. 301, 87 Atl. 987 (1913) ; Micks v. Norton, 256
Mich. 308, 239 N. W. 512 (.932); Cogswell v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 78
N. H. 379, 101 Atl. 145 (1917).
'Morton v. Georgia R. & E. Co., 145 Ga. 516, 89 S. E. 488 (1916);
Mooney v. Chicago, 239 Ill. 414, 88 N. E. 194 (1909); Haskell & B. Car Co.
v. Logermann, 71 Ind. App. 69, 123 N. E. 818 (1919); Berner v. Whittelsey
Mercantile Co., 93 Kan. 769, 145 Pac. 567 (1915); Louisville R. Co. v. Raymond, 135 Ky. 738, 123 S. W. 281 (1909) ; Melitch v. United R. & E. Co., 121
Md. 457, 88 Atl. 229 (1913); Littlewood v. N. Y., 89 N. Y. 24 (1882);
McGahey v. Nassau Electric Ry. Co., 166 N. Y. 617, 59 N. E. 1126 (1901);
Matter of Zounek, 143 Misc. 827, 258 N. Y. Supp. 665 (1932) ; Brown v. Perry,
104 Vt. 66, 156 Atl. 910 (1931) ; Brodie v. Washington Water Power Co., 92
Wash. 574, 159 Pac. 791 (1916).
'Read v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 555 (1868).
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The problem, however, exists in the consideration of the "wrongful death" statutes, wherein we find a great variation in the interpretation which the courts have placed upon the statutes of their respective states. Although the statutes of most jurisdictions are in most
respects similar in substance, there is a sharp division of opinion concerning the original or derivative qualities of such a statute. 10 The
results of labeling it one or the other are self-evident. Interpret the
nature of the action to be derivative, that is, that the rights of the
next of kin are founded upon and based on the rights of the deceased,
the conclusion is inescapable that statements made by the deceased
are admissible." On the other hand, such statements would be inadmissible if we assume the cause of action to be new and original. The
next of kin would not then be in privy with the deceased and would
therefore not be bound by his statements. 1 2 Sound and cogent reasoning support the respective contentions. Briefly put, the former construction proceeds on the theory that the liability of the defendant to
the party injured and the liability over to the administrator for the
benefit of the next of kin is for the same wrongful act and is the same
liability.'3 It is further argued that at the time the deceased made his
statement, the only right of action there was at all was in the decedent.
The executor or next of kin had no claim until he died and then the
foundation of their claim was the injury to him. Therefore, since the
liability is for the same wrongful act, there is merely a succession in
rights, and where there is such succession there is privity between
the parties. This being so, the administrator in an action for the
benefit of the next of kin, is bound by the acts and words of the
deceased.14 Equally tenable and convincing are the arguments adFor example, the Texas wrongful death statute, 3 VERNON'S & SAYLES
CIV. ST. 1914, arts. 4694, 4695, reads: "The wrongful act, negligence,
carelessness, unskillfulness * * * must be of such a character as would, if death
had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action for such
injury." In an action brought under the statute, the court admitted statements
by the deceased to the effect that he did not blame anybody for the accident.
Hovey v. See, 191 S. W. 606 (Tex. 1916); Jewell v. El Paso Electric Co.,
47 S. W. (2d) 328 (Tex. 1932). Contra: Rowe v. Richards, 35 S. D. 201,
151 N. W. 1001 (1915).
Helman v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 58 Ohio 400, 50 N. E. 986 (1898). See
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) § 1081.
"Diaz v. Indust. Comm'r, 80 Utah 77, 13 P. (2d) 307 (1932).
"Helman v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 58 Ohio 400, 50 N. E. 986 (1898) (wherein
the court held that in a trial of an action brought by an administrator to
recover damages for death by wrongful act, it was competent for defendant to
introduce as evidence what the deceased said, after the injury, tending to show
that the injury was caused by his own fault, negligence or carelessness).
Also see, Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 302 Ill.
401, 134
N. E. 754 (1922).
" Walker v. Brantner, 59 Kan. 117, 52 Pac. 80 (1898) (declgrations by
deceased that he did not look to see if a train was approaching, and that, if he
had looked, he could have seen the train and stopped his engine in time to have
avoided the accident, were held admissible). Also see, Hughes v. Delaware &
H. Canal Co., 176 Pa. St. 254, 35 At]. 190 (1896) ; Jewell v. El Paso Electric
Co., 47 S.W. (2d) 328 (Tex. 1932).
ANN.
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vanced by the courts entertaining the opposite view. They proceed
from the premise that it is the very fact of the death from wrongful
conduct at the hands of another which creates the foundation for the
exercise of the right to sue for damages, and therefore in the very
nature of things, could not, under any possible view, exist during or
in the lifetime of the deceased. Therefore, to hold that the right of
action after death is only the succession of the right as it existed in
and belonged to the deceased before his death would be to hold that
the right of action in the heirs lies solely in the damages suffered by
the deceased by reason of the injuries received. This interpretation
is held to be most unreasonable for what damages, in law, could a
person himself suffer by reason of his own death caused by the tortious
act of another. 15
At first blush it would seem that the problem of admissions in a
wrongful death action brought in New York meets with no difficulties for, as has been pointed out, our courts have repeatedly held
Section 130 to create an original cause of action.10 In certain instances,
however, relief has been refused on grounds which would seem to
indicate that for certain purposes, at least, the rights of those for
whom the action is brought are to be deemed derivative. So where
the injured person effected a settlement before death,1 7 or where an
action was brought by the injured person for his damages, which
action went to judgment and the judgment was satisfied before
death,' 8 or where the decedent's cause of action was barred at his
death by the statute of limitations,' 9 it has been held that the action
'Jacksonville Electric Co. v. Sloan, 52 Fla. 257, 42 So. 516 (1906)
(declarations of deceased husband as to his physical condition on the morning
before the afternoon when he was killed, and not part of the res gestae, were
held inadmissible). To the same effect see, Murphy v. St. Louis, etc. Ry., 92
Ark. 159, 122 S.W. 636 (1909); Marks v. Reissinger, 35 Cal. App. 44, 169
Pac. 243 (1917); Diaz v. Industrial Comm., 13 P. (2d) 307 (Utah 1932);
Kiser0 et ux. v. Douglas County, 70 Wash. 242, 126 Pac. 622 (1912).
' Supra note 3.
', Dibble v. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co., 25 Barb. 183 (N. Y. 1857). To the
same effect see, Mich. C. Ry. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 33 Sup. Ct. 192
(1913); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Oliver, 261 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919).
" Littlewood v. City of N. Y., 89 N. Y. 24 (1882). To the same effect
see, Lindsay v. Chic. B. & Q. R. Co., 226 Fed. 23 (C. C. A. 7th, 1915); Perry
v. Phila., B. & W. R. Co., 1 Boyce 399, 77 Atl. 725 (Del. 1910). Also see,
McGahey v. Nassau Electric Ry. Co., 166 N. Y. 617, 59 N. E. 1126 (1901).
"Kelliher v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 212 N. Y. 207, 105 N. E. 824
(1914). In this case, plaintiff's intestate was injured in November, 1906 and
died February, 1912. Plaintiff's intestate brought no action during his lifetime
to recover for his injuries. Within a few months after his decease, his widow
and administratrix brought this action to recover damages sustained by her
and his ne:t of kin. Plaintiff argued that a limitation applicable to actions for
personal injuries cannot be construed to apply to an entirely different and
separate cause of action arising only when the injured party dies "and in which
the damages are exclusively for the benefit of the decedent's husband or wife
and next of kin." The court refused to recognize this contention on the ground
that the statute is qualified by the condition that the action may be brought
only where the person or corporation "would have been liable to an action in
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for wrongful death"was barred. While it would seem that such decisions are difficult to reconcile with the view that the statute creates
an original right, the reason for the decisions is contained in the
wording of the statute itself.-" * * * against a * * * person who would
have been liable to an action in favor of the decedent if death
had not ensued." 20 As was pointed out, most of our "wrongful death" statutes are worded almost identically with Lord
Campbell's Act,2' with the result that there has developed the definite
rule that the representatives cannot maintain the action for wrongful
death, unless the injured person had a right of action for his injuries
immediately before his death.2 2 A construction of Lord Campbell's
Act by the English courts has led to a similar holding. 23 A careful
reading of these decisions discloses that the courts feared that to hold
otherwise would, in some instances, permit a double recovery and the
wrongdoer would then be forced to pay damages twice for the same
wrongful act.2 4 In some of our jurisdictions, though, it has been
held that a release executed by the injured person before his death
cannot deprive the beneficiary of the right of action for the wrongful
favor of the decedent." Also, if such action were to be allowed, then it would

be possible for a deceased's representative to assert a right of action to recover
for an injury forgotten by everyone. The force of such reasoning is shown
by the case of Howard v. Bell Tel. Co., 306 Pa. 518, 160 Atd. 613 (1932),
wherein the decedent's right of action for injuries sustained was barred by the
statute of limitations more than nineteen years before such injuries resulted in
death. The court held the wrongful death action non-maintainable. To the
same effect see, Flynn v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 283 U. S. 837, 51 Sup. Ct.
357 (1931); Knabe v. Hudson Bus. Transp. Co., 111 N. J. L. 333, 168 Atl.
418 (1933); Wiersycki v. Pratt & Letchworth Co., 151 Misc. 207, 271 N. Y.
Supp. 36 (1934) ; Piukkula v. Pillsbury Astoria Flouring Mills Co.. 44 P. (2d)
162 (Ore. 1935); Grant v. Fisher Flouring Mills Co., 44 P. (2d) 193 (Wash.
1935). Contra: Dameron v. So. R. Co., 44 Ga. App. 444, 161 S. E. 641 (1931)
(wherein it was held that a mother's cause of action for the ,wrongful death of
her son was not barred, although the son's cause of action for the injury
subsequently causing his death was barred by the statute of limitations. The
court took the position that a statute of limitations is not intended to destroy
a right of action, but to afford security against stale demands by preventing suit
thereon. The son's failure to bring a suit until the expiration of the statutory
period could not extinguish the wrong so as to bar a cause of action for his
subsequent death, which, although resting on the injury to the deceased, could
not come into being so as to support a suit until his death.
oNEW YORK DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 130, surpra note 2.
Supra note 8.
TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL

ACT (2d ed. 1913) § 124; Hecht v. Ohio

& M. R. R. Co., 132 Ind. 507, 32 N. E. 32 (1892) ; Strode v. St. Louis Transit
Co., 197 Mo. 616, 95 S. W. 851 (1906) ; Edwards v. Interstate Chemical Co.,
170 N. C. 551, 87 S. E. 635 (1916).
'Read Iv. Great Eastern R. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 555 (1868); Williams v.
Mersey Docks & Harbour Board, L. R. 1 K. B. 804 (1905).
'In
Read v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., supra, the court said: "The intention
of the statute is not to make the wrongdoer pay damages twice for the same
wrongful act, but to enable the representatives of the person injured to recover
in a case where the maxim 'actio personalis moritur curn persona' would have
applied: It only points to a case where the party injured has not recovered
compensation against the wrongdoer".
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death which the statute gives him. 25 In the case of Rowe v. Richards,26 wherein plaintiff's husband executed a release to the wrongdoer
before his death, it was said:

"We must confess our inability to grasp the logic of any
course of so called reasoning through which the conclusion is
drawn that the husband, simply because he may live to suffer
from a physical injury, and thus become vested with a cause
of action for the violation of his own personal right, has an
implied power to release a cause of action-one which has not
then accrued; one which may never accrue; one which, if it
does ever accrue, will accrue in favor of the wife, and be based
solely upon a violation of a right vested solely in the wife."
This conclusion is at variance with that of the great weight of
authority construing similar statutes.2 7 It is submitted that so long
as the statute contains words making the remedy dependent upon the
existence in the decedent, at the time of death, of a right of action to
recover damages for such injury, such wording must be given full
force and effect and that therefore such language clearly excludes the
idea that, where the decedent received satisfaction for his injuries,
the condition requisite to the right of the surviving relatives may exist
notwithstanding.28 It does not follow from this, however, that the
statute assumes derivative characteristics, the nature of which may
be enlarged to include admissions of the deceased. The objectives of
the statute are more likely to be obtained by holding that the statute
creates a new right of action but that such right is dependent upon
"Blackwell v. American Film Co., 189 Cal. 689, 209 Pac. 999 (1922);
Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Frederic, 57 Colo. 90, 140 Pac. 463 (1914) ; Phillips
v. Comm. Traction Co., 46 Ohio App. 483, 189 N. E. 444 (1934); Milwaukee
Coke & Gas Co. v. Industrial Commission, 160 Wis. 247, 151 N. W. 245 (1915).
35 S. D. 201, 151 N. W. 1001 (1915).
'See cases cited supra note 22.
'However, where the statute contains no provision making it dependent
on the primary cause of action, then the fact that the decedent had failed to
bring his action for injuries within the limitation period is no bar to an action
by his representative for the damages resulting from his death. In the recent
case of Kaczokowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 Atl. 663 (1936), the
plaintiff's daughter died as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile
accident, the car then being operated by the daughter's husband. Plaintiff,
alleging that the loss of his daughter deprived him of her contributions to his
support, sued the husband's administrator under the Pennsylvania wrongful
death statute which provides: "Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful
violence or negligence, and no suit for damages be brought by the party injured
during his or her life * * * the persons entitled to recover damages for any
injuries causing death shall be the * * * husband, widow, children or parents
of deceased." Plaintiff was allowed a recovery on the theory that the statute
vas not qualified by the condition that the injured person, at the time of death
should be possessed of a cause of action against the person liable for such
injury.
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the possession by the deceased of a cause of action at the time of
his death.
There is suggested the thought, at this point, that as a result of
the present Sections 118, 119 and 120 of the Decedent Estate Law,2"
there is no longer any reason for holding that where an individual
procures a judgment or makes a settlement during his lifetime, the
wrongful death action is barred. We have seen that at common law,
the action abated with the death of the individual.30 No doubt the
legislative intent in creating the wrongful death statutes was to deprive
the defendant of the defense of abatement. Much of the reasoning in
support of the holdings which barred the action for wrongful death
where the decedent during his lifetime had obtained a settlement or
judgment was to the effect that to allow both actions would really be
compelling the defendant to pay twice. It has been shown that the
"wrongful death" statute in New York was promulgated for the
benefit of the next of kin.31 By statute the damages awarded to the
plaintiff is such a sum which is deemed to be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries, resulting from the decedent's
death, to the person or persons for whose benefit the action is
brought.3 2 As a result of Sections 118 and 119 it is now the law in
New York that no cause of action for injury to person or property
shall be lost because of the death of the person in whose favor the
cause of action existed or because of the death of the person liable
for the injury. By Section 120, it is declared that the damages recoverable for such injury shall be limited to those accruing before death,
and shall not include damages for or by reason of death. Also, it is
stated that these damages shall form part of the decedent's estate.
Thus in a situation wherein an individual has been injured and dies
before commencing a personal injury suit, the statute of limitations
not having run. against him, his administrator has two causes of
action: (a) under Section 119, to recover damages accruing before
death, such damages forming part of the deceased's estate, and (b)
under Section 130 for the benefit of the husband, wife or next of kin
for damages resulting to them because of death. Even where both
causes of action are prosecuted to judgment in a single action it is
mandatory that the jury bring in two verdicts. 33 Irrebuttable and
unyielding is the conclusion that as a result of Sections 118, 119 and
120. taken together with Section 130, our law now provides for the
accrual of two distinct causes of action, a fortiori,two distinct recovI'NEW YORK DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 118, added by L. 1935, c. 795, Sept.
1; § 119, added by L, 1935, c. 795, Sept. 1; § 120, added by L. 1935, c. 795,
Sept. 1.
t Supra note 5.
'Supra note 3.
1 NEW YORK DECEDENT

March 25.

1 NEW

Sept 1.

ESTATE LAW §

132, as amended by L. 1935, c. 224,

YORK DECEDENT ESTATE LAW

§ 120, added by L. 1935, c. 795,
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eries. One is for the wrong to the injured person, and is confined to
his personal loss and suffering before he died, while the other is for
the wrong to the beneficiaries, and is confined to their pecuniary loss
through his death. One begins where the other ends, and a recovery
upon both in the same action is not a double recovery for a single
wrong but rather two recoveries for two wrongs. In view of the
above reasoning, can it possibly still be maintained that a settlement
by an individual during his lifetime for damages he suffered constitutes a bar to a recovery under the "wrongful death" statute? If,
when the individual dies the executor may bring two causes of action,
recovering under Section 119 the same amount of damages (except
that no penalties or punitive damages shall be awarded) that the
deceased would have recovered had he prosecuted the action during
his lifetime, and then is permitted under Section 130 to recover
damages for the benefit of the 'wife, husband or next of kin, can we
with good reason say that because it is the executor who brings the
action to recover damages for the personal injuries of the deceased,
that the beneficiaries under Section 130 stand in a better position
than where the deceased himself had recovered the same amount of
damages during his lifetime? Sound reasoning does not lend itself
to the drawing of such an absurdity of distinction.
Also interesting is it to note at this point the problem of receiving into evidence any statements by the deceased, in a situation
wherein both causes of action are consolidated into one action. Since
the cause of action under Section 119 is purely derivative, such statements would clearly be admissible. However, in so far as the cause
of action under Section 130 is concerned, such action being original
in nature, the statements should be inadmissible. Even with proper
instructions from the court, it would seem that the jury might unwittingly consider the evidence admitted in the one in its determination
of the other. It is suggested that in such situations, that is, where
two causes of action are pending, the plaintiff prosecute the actions
separately. Where the defendant moves to consolidate the two actions,
which by statute, he is permitted to do, 34 it is most probable that such
motion would not be granted since the joinder of actions would clearly
work to the prejudice of the plaintiff.
Conclusion.
Section 130 of the Decedent Estate Law has been held to create
a new cause of action for the benefit of the next of kin.35 In certain
instances such actions have been barred due to the belief that at the
time of death it was necessary for the decedent to be possessed of a
valid and subsisting claim against the person liable for the injury.36
NEW YORK DEcMENT EsTATE LAW § 120, supra.
SSupra note 3.
Supra notes 17, 18, 19.
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Whether because of Sections 118, 119 and 120, the courts will now
adopt the view that the reasons for barring the claim no longer exist,
or whether the legislature will deem it advisable to amend Section
130, by striking out therefrom the words " * * * against a * * * person who, or corporation which, would have been liable to an action in
favor of the decedent * * *," is conjectural matter. But, though the
above limitation exists, it is most desirable that we do not enlarge the
scope of dependency of the wrongful death action on the primary personal injury action. The true purpose of the statute is to allow to the
next of kin a recovery of money damages where they have suffered
inestimable loss by reason of the death of the injured person, and any
attempt to defeat this right must be discouraged by the courts. It is
therefore submitted that the ruling in the Kwiatkowski case, barring
the statements of the deceased from being received in evidence, was
quite correct.
HERMAN T. PERS.
TBE.DOcTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN NEw YORK.

In an ordinary negligence action, the plaintiff must convince the
jury that the defendant has been negligent, otherwise the latter will
win. The onus of convincing the jury on this issue is called the
burden of proof and the plaintiff must satisfy this burden by a preponderance of the evidence in his favor.' He must show (1) the
legal harm done to him, (2) how the accident happened, and (3)
that it was proximately caused by the defendant's negligence. 2 This
requires a great deal of positive action on the plaintiff's part and is
properly called a burden. But if the plaintiff comes into court with a
res ipsa loquitur ("The thing speaks for itself") case, and every plaintiff undoubtedly finds this highly desirable, he is spared a great deal
of work though the burden of proof on the whole case still rests on
him.3 For where the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies, there is a
Goldstein v.
1 Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901);
Pullman Co., 220 N. Y. 549, 116 N. E. 376 (1917).
' HARPER, THE LAW OF ToRrs (1933) § 77.
'Volkmar v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 134 N. Y. 418, 31 N. E. 870 (1892);
Hogan v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896); Piehl v.
Albany Ry. Co., 162 N. Y. 617, 57 N. E. 1122 (1900); Day v. Metropolitan
Street Ry. Co., 163 N. Y. 447, 57 N. E. 751 (1900); Griffen v. Manice, 166
N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901); Cunningham v. Dady, 191 N. Y. 152,
83 N. E. 689 (1908); Robinson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 194 N. Y. 37, 86
N. E. 805 (1909); Plumb v. Richmond Light & Ry. Co., 233 N. Y. 285, 135
N. E. 504 (1922) ; Sandier v. Garrison, 249 N. Y. 236, 164 N. E. 36 (1928);
Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 196 N. E. 36 (1935); Tortora v. State,
269 N. Y. 167, 199 N.-E. 44 (1935); Bressler v. N. Y. Rapid Transit Corp.,
270 N. Y. 409, 1 N. E. (2d) 828 (1936) ; Lessig v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co.,
271 N. Y. 250, 2 N. E. (2d) 646 (1936) ; Smith v. Brooklyn Heights, 82 App.
Div. 531, 81 N. Y. Supp. 838 (2d Dept. 1903); Whitcher v. Board of Educa,tion, 236 App. Div. 293, 258 N. Y. Supp. 556 (3d Dept. 1932).

